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PLEADING GUILTY WITHOUT CLIENT CONSENT
GABRIEL J. CHIN*
ABSTRACT
In some cases, lawyers are, and should be, permitted to conclude
plea bargains to which their clients have not agreed. Because clients
bear the consequences of a conviction, ordinarily, clients should
choose between a plea and the possibility of acquittal at trial.
Further, clients have the right to decide that even though conviction
is practically certain, moral or political reasons warrant insistence
on a trial. But some clients have the goal of minimizing incarcera-
tion, have been offered reasonable pleas, face substantially greater
sentences if convicted after trial, have no plausible ground for
acquittaland nevertheless decline to plead guilty. They may do so
because they are cognitively unable to make a decision or complete a
plea colloquy, or because they are holding out for a miracle. The tra-
ditional understanding of lawyer-client decision-making authority
would lead to the conclusion that the client has the absolute right to
reject a plea, even if it inevitably makes the client worse off, on her
own terms, by increasing the imprisonment she is trying to avoid.
This Article proposes that the Supreme Courts decision in Florida v.
Nixon leads to a different conclusion. In Nixon, a unanimous Court
held that defense counsel could tell the jury in an opening statement
that a defendant was guilty in hopes of improving the clients
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School of Law. For helpful comments, I thank the participants in the Symposium, Laura
Conover, Brandon Garrett, Andrew Kim, Barak Orbach, Abbe Smith, John Stoller, Bryan
Taylor, and the faculties at Concordia University School of Law and UC Davis School of Law.
I also benefited from participating in a panel on plea bargaining at the 2015 AALS Annual
Meeting with Darryl Brown, Susan Klein, Jenny Roberts, Jenia Iontcheva Turner, and Ron
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position for sentencing. The principle of Nixon has been expanded in
lower courts to cover a range of issues and contexts. If Nixon allows
a concession of guilt in the inchoate hope of obtaining a more fa-
vorable sentence, it should also allow a concession to obtain a specific
agreement. Nixon does not extend to situations where the client ac-
tually objects to defense counsels action. But short of actual client
objection, defense counsel should be able to assist a client in achiev-
ing her goal of minimizing incarceration or avoiding execution even
if that means making concessions on issues that were once thought
to require personal action by the client.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article proposes that defense counsel are, and should be,
authorized to negotiate and conclude plea bargains to which their
clients have not agreed when a client faces catastrophic sentencing
consequences by irrationally refusing a reasonable plea. This is a
decidedly second-best solution to problems created by our criminal
justice system, which in many jurisdictions is characterized by
harsh mandatory sentences, overcriminalization and overprose-
cution, underresourced or otherwise ineffective defense counsel, and
use of the criminal justice system to address problems like mental
illness that would be better handled by other institutions. Neverthe-
less, it may be the best second-best solution available.
Overwhelming majorities of criminal defendants whose cases
progress to the point of decision elect to plead guilty.1 The numbers
are so high that the question of why is interesting and important.2
Indeed, the numbers are so high that the question of why does
anyone plead not guilty is equally interesting. Given the reality
that criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not
a system of trials,3 what motivates a handful of defendants to go to
trial, knowing that the result may well be a much harsher sentence?
There are, of course, many understandable reasons for failure to
1. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (Ninety-seven percent of federal
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions result from guilty pleas.). This Article
does not address the merits of plea bargaining as an institution. For recent relevant literature
on that subject, see generally Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extraju-
dicial Reforms, 126 HARV. L. REV. 150 (2012); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the
Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464 (2004) [hereinafter Bibas, Outside the Shadow of
Trial]; Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit
Strategies, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1155 (2005); Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End
of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 84 (2005) (Acquittals are
steadily disappearing from the federal system.... [I]ncreasing accuracy probably does not ex-
plain this trend; unfortunately, the pattern has unfolded because federal prosecutors have
accumulated so much power under the sentencing laws that they can punish defendants too
severely for going to trial.).
2. One reason in some cases is the inadequacy of defense services. See generally Cara H.
Drinan, Getting Real About Gideon: The Next Fifty Years of Enforcing the Right to Counsel,
70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1309, 1310 (2013); Eve Brensike Primus, The Illusory Right to
Counsel, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 597 (2011); Robert E. Toone, The Absence of Agency in Indigent
Defense, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 25 (2015).
3. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388.
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reach agreement, even if the prosecution, defense counsel, and the
client are informed, rational, and engaged.4 One unfortunate rea-
sonthe focus of this Articleis that some clients who cannot
plausibly assert innocence and want to minimize their incarceration
nevertheless irrationally decline reasonable plea offers in favor of
hopeless trials.5 Abbe Smith has usefully cataloged techniques that
conscientious defense lawyers can use to persuade clients to plead
guilty when there is no chance of acquittal at trial.6 But for a variety
of reasons, including youth and mental illness, some clients will not
cut their losses in the face of certain disaster.7
Imagine, for example, Donna Davenport, a thirty-two-year-old cli-
ent in state court facing a counterfeiting charge. Multiple officers
arrested the client for possession of forged state government checks
at an apartment leased in Ms. Davenports name. Her fingerprints
4. The prosecution may consider its case so strong and/or the offense so serious that no
plea offer is made. A plea offer may be close to the potential sentence exposure after trial,
giving the client no incentive to take it. The defense may have judgments about whether
witnesses will show up or whether evidence will persuade a jury. The defense may have cards
to play at trial that the prosecution does not fully appreciate. In principle, because of
constitutional disclosure obligations, there should be fewer surprises in the prosecutions case.
See, e.g., Jonathan Abel, Bradys Blind Spot: Impeachment Evidence in Police Personnel Files
and the Battle Splitting the Prosecution Team, 67 STAN. L. REV. 743, 745 (2015). The prose-
cution might make a reasonable offer, but the defendant might want to take a chance on even
a relatively low possibility of acquittal. A defense attorney may persuade a client to reject a
reasonable plea and go to trial against the clients interests because, for example, the attorney
is paid more per hour for trial work than for out-of-court work. Some ... defendants might
insist on objectively hopeless trials for a reason that oversimplified, punishment-focused
applications of the rational-actor model do not fully account for: principle. Kyle Graham,
Crimes, Widgets, and Plea Bargaining: An Analysis of Charge Content, Pleas, and Trials, 100
CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1625 (2012) (discussing tax protesters). For further discussion of various
structural and psychological influences that affect plea bargaining, see Bibas, Outside the
Shadow of Trial, supra note 1, at 2467-69.
5. See Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Response to Critics, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 1115, 1127 (2008) (A hopeless trial has a downside: criminal defense costs
money and effort. Furthermore, finding out that the defendant wasted her time may prompt
the sentencing judge to waste the defendants time in return.). 
6. See Abbe Smith, I Aint Takin No Plea: The Challenges in Counseling Young People
Facing Serious Time, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 11, 23-30 (2007) [hereinafter Smith, Challenges in
Counseling]; Abbe Smith, The Lawyers Conscience and the Limits of Persuasion, 36
HOFSTRA L. REV. 479, 491-96 (2007).
7. Smith, Challenges in Counseling, supra note 6, at 12. For an example of a case that
went to trial in which an appeals court found the evidence of guilt overwhelming, and no
defenses sufficiently substantial to be worthy of jury consideration, see People v. Dwight, 592
N.Y.S.2d 10, 10-11 (App. Div. 1993).
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were found on the checks, and color laser printers and blank check
stock were found in open view in the apartment. Forensic examina-
tion of a computer found in the apartment revealed an account with
the username Donna containing images of forged checks which
had been passed, other checks in the process of creation, and email
and social media accounts in the name Donna Davenport. The
search was based on a warrant supported by an affidavit from an
informant who swore that he had recently purchased forged checks
from Ms. Davenport at her apartment.
Ms. Davenport has a prior misdemeanor forgery conviction for
which she received probation, and a felony forgery conviction for
which she was sentenced to ninety days in jail plus probation. The
current charge carries a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence, a
probable guideline calculation of fourteen years, and a twenty-year
maximum. The district attorney offered Ms. Davenport a sentence
of six years in exchange for a guilty plea, but the client, aware that
criminal cases are sometimes dismissed outright, and that some
defendants charged with serious crimes are allowed to plead to mi-
nor sentences, insisted that she will accept no more than five years.
If the case is tried, Ms. Davenport has decided not to testify, because
she recognizes it would not help. She also understands that she
would be impeached with prior forgery convictions, and that her
sentence might well be increased if the judge concludes she lied
about her conduct.
After reviewing the search warrant and police report, evaluating
the records of the officers who executed the search, interviewing
Ms. Davenport about her background and possible defenses, and
researching the provisions and constitutional validity of the sub-
stantive offense and of the sentencing regime, defense counsel
concluded that the search was valid, the evidence is overwhelming,
there are no viable defenses, and, therefore, that a trial will result
in a conviction. Defense counsel also made the case to the prosecutor
that a sentence of less than six years was appropriate, to no avail.
Defense counsel has concluded that the sentence will be at least the
mandatory minimum, and the assigned judge tends to follow the
guidelines, so the sentence is likely to be fourteen years. But in spite
of half a dozen visits to the jail where Ms. Davenport is confined,
defense counsel has been unable to persuade her that accepting the
2016] PLEADING GUILTY WITHOUT CLIENT CONSENT 1315
plea offer is the right decision. Ms. Davenport has expressed willing-
ness to take probation, pay partial restitution, or accept community
service.
On their surface, traditional rules of legal ethics and constitu-
tional doctrine lead to the conclusion that there is no solution to the
problem of an irrational client acting against her interests; Ms.
Davenport may conclusively reject the six-year offer even though
that decision will harm her as surely as summer follows spring.8
Traditionally, the ethical rules seem to say that clients set goals and
lawyers decide strategy and tactics.9 A lawyer cannot unilaterally
conclude that a client would be better off taking a plea of ten years,
rather than risking a 30 percent chance of a murder conviction at
trial. Similarly, a client cannot insist that a lawyer put on a fifth
cumulative impeachment witness, or refuse to stipulate to founda-
tion of an indisputably genuine document. This is understood to
mean that clients make the basic choice between trial and plea.10
After all, as the saying goes, the lawyer is not the one who has to do
the time.
In addition, the Court has stated that some specific decisions are
within the clients exclusive authority as a matter of constitutional
criminal procedure, including whether to plead guilty, waive a jury,
testify on his or her own behalf, or take an appeal.... [W]ith some
limitations, a defendant may [also] elect to act as his or her own
advocate.11
8. I do not say that conviction is an absolute certaintypolice evidence rooms can be
destroyed in disasters such as earthquakes or floodsrather, conviction is practically certain.
Cf. Michael Sullivan, How a Volcano Eruption Wiped Away Summer, NPR (Oct. 22, 2007,
12:55 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=15448607 [https://perma.cc/
X5JN-9P2W] (noting that, in 1816, spring and summer weather patterns were disrupted
worldwide after a volcanic eruption).
9. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASSN 2013); RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 22 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). See generally Lynn
Mather, What Do Clients Want? What Do Lawyers Do?, 52 EMORY L.J. 1065 (2003); Rodney
J. Uphoff & Peter B. Wood, The Allocation of Decisionmaking Between Defense Counsel and
Criminal Defendant: An Empirical Study of Attorney-Client Decisionmaking, 47 KAN. L. REV.
1 (1998).
10. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
11. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Gonzalez
v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 248 (2008) (citing New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114-15
(2000)).
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Based on these constitutional and ethical constraints, it would
appear that an attorney is required to educate, persuade, and coun-
sel,12 but that the client enjoys the final decision of whether to reject
an advantageous guilty plea offer in favor of a certain conviction
that will result in a much more severe penalty.
Traditional principles of allocating lawyer-client authority were
established when there were fewer pleas, or at least when the cen-
trality of plea bargaining was not fully appreciated and recognized.13
Equally important, mandatory sentencing was much less preva-
lent.14 Traditional doctrines thus create a paradox. The Supreme
Court has held that there must be a knowing and voluntary waiver
of important rights as a predicate to pleading guilty.15 This principle
recognizes that a guilty plea is a dangerous path when it means
giving up a free shot at acquittal through trial, especially when the
sentence after trial may be the same. In Boykin v. Alabama, for
example, guilty pleas to robbery charges led to five death sentences;
the plea may have been convenient for the court-appointed lawyer,
but it had no apparent benefit for Boykin.16 The knowing and
12. See MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT r. 2.1 cmt. (AM. BAR ASSN 2013) (A client is
entitled to straightforward advice expressing the lawyers honest assessment. Legal advice
often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may be disinclined to confront.
In presenting advice, a lawyer endeavors to sustain the clients morale and may put advice
in as acceptable a form as honesty permits. However, a lawyer should not be deterred from
giving candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client.). I
thank Bryan Taylor for pointing out that whether a plea is accepted may turn on the views
of defense counsel as much as the views of the client. That is, defense lawyers may fail to con-
vey offers to clients (which is clearly unethical), or may fail to offer advice about the likely
consequences of various courses of action that the client might have taken, or at least con-
sidered, had such advice been rendered.
13. See generally George Fisher, Plea Bargainings Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857 (2000)
(examining the increasing prevalence and power of the plea-bargaining system during the late
twentieth century).
14. See id. at 1067-72 (discussing the impact of mandatory sentencing on power dynamics
in plea bargaining).
15. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (It was error, plain on the face of the
record, for the trial judge to accept petitioners guilty plea without an affirmative showing
that it was intelligent and voluntary.); see also, e.g., Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183
(2005) (A guilty plea operates as a waiver of important rights, and is valid only if done volun-
tarily, knowingly, and intelligently, with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances
and likely consequences. (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970))).
16. See 395 U.S. at 240. Thus, the dissenting Alabama Supreme Court justices who be-
lieved the conviction should be reversed stated:
It is to be noted that we are not dealing here with a case where there was an
agreement between the district attorney and the defendant as to a sentence less
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voluntary waiver rule recognizes that a client faces a dilemma when
the choice is between a plea bargain and a calculated risk at trial.
Such value choices and risk calculations are properly for the client,
not for the attorney.17
Given the importance of pleas and the realities of mandatory
sentencing, however, the choice will now often be between a plea
offer and the practical certainty of a conviction carrying a much
higher sentence.18 In such instances, one might contend that a plea
of not guilty is as risky and portentous as a guilty plea because it
also waives substantial rightsa favorable plea bargainand
therefore it, too, should be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.19
Clients seeking the lowest possible sentence and with nothing to
gain from a trial might nevertheless be unable to accept a plea. A
client might be competent to stand trial under the lenient standard,
yet be uncommunicative.20 Another client might not be sufficiently
than capital upon the entering by defendant of a guilty plea. There is nothing in
the record or briefs indicating the defendants trial strategy in pleading guilty
in these five cases.
Boykin v. State, 207 So. 2d 412, 415 (Ala. 1968) (Goodwyn, J., dissenting), revd, 395 U.S. 238
(1969).
17. See Erica J. Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal Defendants Right to
Control the Case, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1147, 1178 (2010) (For example, imagine a defendant who
has only a twenty percent chance of being acquitted at trial and will receive a sentence of thir-
ty years in prison if convicted. If the prosecutor offers a plea that would result in a fifteen-year
sentence, most lawyers would recommend that the defendant take that plea. But different
defendants have different views of the value of the twenty percent chance of being acquitted....
[T]he defendant is the only person who can prioritize the various competing interests at
stake.).
18. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in
Criminal Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1610-11 (2005).
19. Given modern realities, the decision to reject a plea bargain merits similar protec-
tion as that given to waivers of other important rights. Recent Case, Williams v. Jones, 571
F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), 123 HARV. L. REV. 1795, 1800 (2010); see also Jenny
Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2669-72 (2013); David A.
Perez, Note, Deal or No Deal? Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During Plea
Bargaining, 120 YALE L.J. 1532, 1535-36 (2011).
20. See United States v. McDonald, No. 01-2348, 2002 WL 1767534, at *5 (10th Cir. Aug.
1, 2002) (Defendant also argues that his conduct at trial demonstrated an inability to consult
with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. Yet his conduct at trial was
less disruptive than anticipated by the district court, and his one outburst was no more inco-
herent than his remarks at the competency hearing. Despite noting persistent psychoses that
could affect his approach to the case, all three competency reports stated that Defendant could
still consult with his attorney with a rational degree of understanding.); Strickland v. State,
815 S.W.2d 309, 311-13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (upholding competency finding even though
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organized cognitively to get through a plea colloquy, causing a judge
to reject the plea and send the case to trial.21 Some clients might be
too indecisive to accept or reject any given course of action, prefer-
ring to wait another day, thus allowing the opportunity to pass.22 In
short, in the context of a hopeless case some clients may not, in the
broadest sense, be capable of knowingly, voluntarily, and intelli-
gently pleading either guilty or not guilty. In terms of minimizing
sentences, it might be advantageous for the default rule to be that
the client accepts the last best plea offer unless she affirmatively
rejects it and demands a trial, rather than the opposite.
This Article proposes, tentatively, that there may be a legitimate
and fair workaround in situations where there is overwhelming
evidence of guilt and no defense23 yet the client is unable to plead
guilty. Under Supreme Court decisions as developed in the lower
courts, the formal decision-making regime has changed, at least
practically and functionally, in favor of the attorney: attorneys can
now effectively plead guilty without their clients consent.24 As a
tentative conclusion, holding constant other aspects of the criminal
defense counsel gave the following testimony during the competency hearing: I have been
unable to communicate with my client, I find that he has no reasonable degree of rational
understanding of the proceedings against him. He has no rational or factual understanding
at all of what is happening to him.).
21. See United States v. Hernandez-Rivas, 513 F.3d 753, 760-61 (7th Cir. 2008) ([T]he
district court judge did not abuse his discretion when he rejected Hernandez-Rivass guilty
plea after repeated attempts to obtain a sufficient factual basis from Hernandez-Rivas under
Rule 11.).
22. See United States v. Evans, 496 F. Appx 950, 955 (11th Cir. 2012) ([T]he district
court rejected Evanss guilty plea based upon the pleas questionable voluntariness, partic-
ularly because Evans had already changed his mind about pleading guilty multiple times
during that same hearing.); cf. State v. Gordon, 880 A.2d 825, 831 (R.I. 2005) (quoting trial
judge who stated: Its clear to this Court, to this Judge, that this defendant commenced a
campaign to delay this trial in the hope that its going to go away.).
23. People v. Johnson, 538 N.E.2d 1118, 1125 (Ill. 1989); see also, e.g., United States v.
Robinson, No. 06-604-01, 2010 WL 3749475, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2010) (This is truly a
case in which no defense counsel, however skilled or imaginative, could have secured a not
guilty verdict given the nature of the governments overwhelming evidence.).
24. See infra Part I.
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justice system,25 this shift in authority is probably good for clients
and for the legal system.
Concretely, my proposal addresses serious felony cases with the
following characteristics: (1) the prosecution has made a plea offer
that is favorable in some wayto a specific sentence, without cer-
tain enhancements or mandatory minimums, or to a lesser charge;
(2) the post-trial sentence is likely to be substantially higher than
the plea offer; (3) after full factual and legal investigation, counsel
concludes that there is no realistic likelihood of an acquittal because
the readily available admissible evidence is overwhelming and there
are no available defenses; (4) the client has set the goal of the repre-
sentation as minimizing the sentence; and (5) there is no reasonable
basis to decline the plea offer; but (6) after thorough counseling and
discussion, the client is unwilling or unable to plead guilty. In such
cases, the prosecution might be willing to leave the plea offer open,
not in exchange for a guilty plea, but in exchange for a streamlined
trial presentation. If so, defense counsel should be able to stipulate
to facts and to admission of evidence and testimony, thereby achiev-
ing the best available outcome for her client. The trial, such as it is,
could be done largely on paper, and perhaps without a jury. To re-
turn to the Donna Davenport example, if the prosecution will agree
to the six-year sentence, her lawyer should be able to stipulate to
the admission of the check stock into evidence, that it was blank
check stock found in her apartment, and that the evidence shows
she is guilty of the offense, so long as the lawyer consults with Ms.
Davenport about this plan, and she does not affirmatively object.
25. Two features of the system make it important that clients have every opportunity to
obtain the benefits of plea bargains: (1) the absence of a principle that sentences based on
pleas should be proportional to sentences following trials; and (2) the absence of a financial
constraint on police, prosecutors, and judges when arresting, prosecuting, or sentencing. Cf.
Jeffrey Bellin, Attorney Competence in an Age of Plea Bargaining and Econometrics, 12 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 153, 153 (2014) (asserting that [f]acts should control who wins or loses in
court but suggesting that evidence shows that quality of defense counsel is a significant
factor); Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to
Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1655 (2010) (suggesting that prosecutors are ill-suited
to consider the normative merits of potential charges); Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R.
Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal
Defendants, 105 NW.U.L.REV. 261, 262-63 (2011) (noting that prosecutors are too overworked
to pay careful attention to individual cases).
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I. THE QUIET REVOLUTION OF FLORIDA V. NIXON
The Supreme Court has made clear the domain of exclusive client
decision-making authority is mapped narrowly. As Pamela Metzger
explained in an article critical of the development, [t]he Court has
cabined defendants vigorous exercise of their adjudicatory rights by
shifting control of Sixth Amendment rights from the accused to de-
fense counsel.26 The key case is Florida v. Nixon, a unanimous 2004
decision written by Justice Ginsburg, with Chief Justice Rehnquist
not participating.27 The Court nominally adhered to the rule that
the lawyer cannot plead guilty for the client.28 But, without so much
as a cautionary concurrence, the Court held that the lawyer can tell
the jury that the client is guilty, even without the clients consent,
as a tactical choice.29
Nixon was a capital murder case.30 Nixons trial lawyer evidently
prepared the case well; after he deposed all of the prosecutions
witnesses,31 he concluded that guilt was not subject to any reason-
able dispute.32 In addition to physical evidence, there were police
and nonpolice confessions.33 The lawyer unsuccessfully sought a
noncapital plea.34 He concluded that the best strategy was to con-
cede guilt, thereby preserving his credibility with the jury when
arguing against the death penalty during the penalty phase.35 The
lawyer explained the strategy to the client, who neither agreed nor
26. Pamela R. Metzger, Fear of Adversariness: Using Gideon to Restrict Defendants
Invocation of Adversary Procedures, 122 YALE L.J. 2550, 2556 (2013).
27. See 543 U.S. 175 (2004).
28. See id. at 187.
29. See id. at 192. Nixon was not the first decision to so hold. See, e.g., Abshier v. State,
28 P.3d 579, 594 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001) (acknowledging that it could be reasonable trial
strategy to candidly concede guilt early in the trial in order to establish credibility), overruled
in part on other grounds by Jones v. State, 134 P.3d 150, 155 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006). In addi-
tion, apparently not all courts follow Nixon; under state law, at least Minnesota and North
Carolina seem to require client consent to concede guilt. See, e.g., State v. Prtine, 784 N.W.2d
303, 318 (Minn. 2010) (The decision to concede guilt is the defendants decision alone to
make.); State v. Maready, 695 S.E.2d 771, 775 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (holding the same).
30. See Nixon, 543 U.S. at 178.
31. See id. at 180.
32. Id. at 181.
33. Id. at 179.
34. Id. at 181.
35. Id.
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objected.36 In his opening statement, the lawyer told the jury: In
this case, there wont be any question, none whatsoever, that my
client, Joe Elton Nixon, caused Jeannie Bickners death .... [T]hat
fact will be proved to your satisfaction beyond any doubt.37 Defense
counsel put on eight witnesses, including a psychiatrist and a psy-
chologist in the penalty phase, but the jury voted for the death
penalty.38
The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that a concession
of guilt by counsel required at least affirmative client consent,39 but
the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court said that the lawyer was
obliged to, and in fact several times did, explain his proposed trial
strategy .... [He] was not additionally required to gain express
consent before conceding Nixons guilt.40 The Court explained:
Counsel ... may reasonably decide to focus on the trials penalty
phase, at which time counsels mission is to persuade the trier that
his clients life should be spared.41 This is a tactic to achieve the
ends apparently set by the clientavoiding execution.
The Court drew a fine line between a formal guilty plea and a
factual concession. Notwithstanding the concession during opening,
Nixon retained the rights accorded a defendant in a criminal tri-
al.... The State was obliged to present during the guilt phase
competent, admissible evidence establishing the essential ele-
ments of the crimes with which Nixon was charged.... Further,
the defense reserved the right to cross-examine witnesses for the
prosecution and could endeavor, as [counsel] did, to exclude pre-
judicial evidence.42
The Court distinguished an important Warren Court precedent,
Brookhart v. Janis, which involved a defendant who expressly
waived a jury trial and whose lawyer agreed to a prima facie trial,
but who personally stated that he did not wish to plead guilty.43 A
36. Id.
37. Id. at 182.
38. Id. at 183-84.
39. Id. at 185-86 (citing Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618, 624 (Fla. 2000)).
40. Id. at 189.
41. Id. at 191.
42. Id. at 188.
43. See id. at 187-89 (citing Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1966)).
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prima facie trial, a procedure obscure even to the Ohio Assistant
Attorney General who argued the case, was apparently the equiva-
lent of a no contest plea.44 The Court held that counsel had no pow-
er to enter a plea which is inconsistent with his clients expressed
desire and thereby waive his clients constitutional right to plead
not guilty and have a trial in which he can confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against him.45
But the Courts distinction between a permissible concession and
an impermissible plea is evanescent. Technically, Nixon could put
on evidence and challenge the prosecutions case, and if for some
bizarre reason it turned out, say, that all of the states evidence was
about some other incident not involving Nixon, his lawyer could
make that point. However, the practical opportunity to contest the
key trial issuewhether the defendant committed a murderno
longer existed.46 Also, the value of doing so had dramatically
changed; if Nixons attorney had suddenly suggested that particular
pieces of evidence were unpersuasive or irrelevant, the jury would
have been at least perplexed and possibly angered. Indeed, the
distinction between a formal guilty plea and what the Court ap-
proved is so thin that some courts simplify Nixon as holding that
counsel can plead guilty without a clients permission.47
In lower courts, Nixon has been expanded in several ways. First,
the principle clearly applies to noncapital cases. Nixon itself stated
that such a concession in a run-of-the-mine trial might present a
closer question, [but] the gravity of the potential sentence in a
44. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 9 & n.* (separate opinion of Harlan, J.).
45. Id. at 7.
46. See Nixon, 543 U.S. at 191 (It is not good to put on a he didnt do it defense and a he
is sorry he did it mitigation. This just does not work. (quoting Andrea Lyon, Defending the
Death Penalty Case: What Makes Death Different, 42 MERCER L. REV. 695, 708 (1991))).
Presumably, it works even less well to whipsaw the jury and court by contending that he
didnt do it, he did it, oops, he didnt do it and then he is sorry he did it by pleading not
guilty, conceding during opening statement, reneging on the concession by taking advantage
of trial rights, and then making an apologetic case in mitigation.
47. See Nance v. Ozmint, 626 S.E.2d 878, 880 (S.C. 2006) (In Nixon, the United States
Supreme Court held that entering a guilty plea on behalf of a defendant without his express
consent did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court opined that the decision
to plead guilty was a strategy employed by trial counsel in an effort to present mitigating
evidence at sentencing in an attempt to save the defendants life.) (citation omitted); see also
Alan Dershowitz, Legal Ethics and the Constitution, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 747, 756-57 (2006)
(describing the Nixon holding as you cant plead a client guilty without his consent but you
can, in effect, plead him guilty by acknowledging that he did it).
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capital trial and the proceedings two-phase structure vitally affect
counsels strategic calculus.48 But of course, in jurisdictions like the
United States that have mandatory or discretionary sentencing
guidelines, there is also a two-phase structure with a trial-type
sentencing hearing normally following a guilty plea or a trial con-
viction. In addition, as the Court has recognized, even noncapital
sentences may be quite grave.49 Thus, lower courts have applied
Nixon outside the capital context.50
In addition, many courts have held that Nixon applies to formal
stipulations as well as statements.51 This makes sense given the
practical implications of a trial concession. It is further supported
by the legal principle, for some reason not mentioned in the Courts
decision, that an unambiguous factual concession in an opening
statement can constitute a binding judicial admission.52 Courts have
48. 543 U.S. at 190-91.
49. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (invalidating mandatory life
without parole sentences for juveniles).
50. See, e.g., Monroe v. Dale, No. 05 Civ. 6704(LAK), 2007 WL 1766770, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
June 17, 2007) ([C]oncession of guilt in non-capital case does not necessarily warrant finding
of prejudice under Cronic; concession may be made without clients express consent (citing
Frascone v. Duncan, No. 01 Civ. 5924, 2005 WL 1404791, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2005)));
United States v. Larson, 66 M.J. 212, 218 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (applying Nixon in a noncapital
case, and noting that Pineo v. State, 908 A.2d 632, 638-39 (Me. 2006), also did so); Hopkins
v. United States, 84 A.3d 62, 66 (D.C. 2014) (upholding defense counsels strategic concession
at trial that Hopkins was guilty of unarmed [possession of drugs with intent to distribute]). 
51. See, e.g., Allerdice v. Ryan, 395 F. Appx 449, 452 (9th Cir. 2010) (The stipulations did
not compare to a guilty plea. Defense counsel still vigorously contested the states evidence,
especially with respect to Allerdices mental state.); Commonwealth v. Brown, 18 A.3d 1147,
1163 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) (Thus, the United States Supreme Court has held that the deci-
sion as to whether to cross-examine a witness and what agreements to enter about admission
of evidence are rights that a lawyer may relinquish on behalf of a defendant without the
defendants express consent. These matters relate to the conduct of trial and strategy, and in
the absence of ineffectiveness in making the decision, which did not occur herein, the client
is bound by his counsels decision. Thus, a colloquy did not have to be held in this case.);
Whitehurst v. Commonwealth, 754 S.E.2d 910, 912 (Va. Ct. App. 2014) (Decisions that may
be made without the defendants consent primarily involve trial strategy and tactics, such as
what evidence should be introduced, what stipulations should be made, what objections
should be raised, and what pre-trial motions should be filed. (quoting Sexton v. French, 163
F.3d 874, 885 (4th Cir. 1998))). But see State v. Humphries, 336 P.3d 1121, 1123, 1126 (Wash.
2014) (finding impermissible a stipulation to the existence of prior conviction when made over
clients objection).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Houser, 754 F.3d 1335, 1352 (11th Cir. 2014) (Mr. Housers
counsel invited the court to conclude that the Government had met its burden of proof with
respect to all of the elements of Count Eleven; having done so, he cannot now claim error in
the courts determination that the Government did, in fact, meet that burden.); United States
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also held that because the decision is within the lawyers discretion,
the trial court need not inquire of the client directly.53
Moreover, courts have applied Nixon to give lawyers final deci-
sion-making authority on a wide range of other legal and factual
matters,54 including whether to call55 or cross-examine56 witnesses,
v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1984) (The binding effect on a party of a clear and
unambiguous admission of fact made by his or her attorney in an opening statement was
acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 263 (1880).); see
also FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D) (statement not hearsay if it was made by the partys agent or
employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and while it existed).
53. See State v. Allen, 220 P.3d 245, 246 (Ariz. 2009) (This case addresses whether a
court must engage a defendant who stipulates to the elements of a criminal offense in a
colloquy like that afforded a defendant who pleads guilty. We conclude that, unless the defen-
dant pleads guilty to an offense, no specific colloquy is required by Boykin v. Alabama or
Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.) (citation omitted); Armenta-Carpio v. State, 306
P.3d 395, 396 (Nev. 2013) (We now hold, consistent with Florida v. Nixon, that a concession-
of-guilt strategy is not the equivalent of a guilty plea and therefore the trial judge has no
obligation to canvass a defendant concerning a concession-of-guilt strategy.) (citation omit-
ted); see also Commonwealth v. Evelyn, 26 N.E.3d 158, 165 (Mass. 2015) (Because no colloquy
was required regarding defense counsels concession of guilt to the lesser included offense of
manslaughter in opening statement and closing argument, the defendants convictions are
affirmed.).
54. Of course, even before Nixon, courts recognized that counsel had final decision-making
authority over many issues. See, e.g., New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114-15 (2000) (Thus,
decisions by counsel are generally given effect as to what arguments to pursue, what eviden-
tiary objections to raise, and what agreements to conclude regarding the admission of
evidence. Absent a demonstration of ineffectiveness, counsels word on such matters is the
last.) (citations omitted); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.6(a)
(4th ed. 2015).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 716 F.3d 999, 1011 (7th Cir. 2013) (But whether
to call any other witnesses was her lawyers decision.... Parkers attorney consulted with her
about whether to call any other witnesses and he decided against it.... [I]n another case, he
had called a witness his client wanted to testify, and watched that whole case fall apart. He
was not inclined to do it again.); Puglisi v. State, 112 So. 3d 1196, 1206 (Fla. 2013) ([T]he
decision to present witnesses is not a fundamental decision resting exclusively with a criminal
defendant.... Defense counsel must have the ultimate authority in exercising his or her clients
constitutional right to present witnesses as such is a tactical, strategic decision within
counsels professional judgment. Therefore, if a criminal defendant disagrees[,] ... it is the de-
fense counsel who has the ultimate authority on the matter so long as he or she continues to
represent the defendant.) (footnote omitted).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Zepeda, 738 F.3d 201, 207 (9th Cir. 2013), rehg en banc
granted, 742 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2014) ([D]efense counsel may waive an accuseds constitution-
al rights as a part of trial strategy. Counsels authority extends to waivers of the accuseds
Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination and confrontation as a matter of trial tactics or
strategy.) (citation omitted); People v. Campbell, 802 N.E.2d 1205, 1210 (Ill. 2003) (We note
... that a majority of the courts that have addressed the issue have held that counsel in a
criminal case may waive his clients [S]ixth [A]mendment right of confrontation by stipulating
to the admission of evidence.).
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raise defenses,57 or request or object to instructions;58 whether the
client is present at sidebar discussions;59 and whether the trial is
public.60 Nixon has also been applied to a range of issues about the
identity of the judge or factfinder: attorneys have been allowed to
decide whether a federal magistrate rather than an Article III judge
57. See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656-57, 656 n.19 (1984) ([T]he Sixth
Amendment does not require that counsel do what is impossible or unethical. If there is no
bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create one and may disserve the interests of
his client by attempting a useless charade.); Hyde v. Branker, 286 F. Appx 822, 833 (4th Cir.
2008) (Hydes counsel essentially made the strategic choice to try to preserve their credibility
with the jury by not asserting a defense they thought would fail, in the hopes of persuading
the jury at sentencing to spare Hydes life.); Allen v. Sobina, 148 F. Appx 90, 92-93 (3d Cir.
2005) (The record here indicates that Allens defense counsel was faced with overwhelming
evidence establishing that Allen committed the killing, including Allens own oral admission
to police. Thus, counsels decision to concede Allens involvement, but to focus on avoiding the
death penalty, is deemed a tactical decision after Nixon, and the Cronic presumption of
prejudice does not apply. Given the evidence against Allen, he cannot show that he was
prejudiced by his attorneys decision.); Pineo v. State, 908 A.2d 632, 639 (Me. 2006) (There
was overwhelming evidence of Pineos guilt. Arguing that Pineo was not intoxicated,
especially after the loss of a motion in limine to exclude the blood-alcohol test, or that Pineo
was not the cause of the accident, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, could rea-
sonably be perceived as being likely to undermine the defendants credibility before the jury
and with the court at sentencing.... Moreover, the attorneys decisions not to call an expert
witness to offer a psychological report about Pineos mental state, and not to request a
presentence investigation for the sentencing hearing, are strategic choices entitled to
substantially heightened deference.).
58. See Woodard v. United States, 738 A.2d 254, 258 (D.C. 1999) (noting split on question
of whether counsel or client decides whether to request instruction on lesser included offense).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 677 F.3d 138, 141-42 (3d Cir. 2012) (An attorneys
obligation to consult with his client does not require counsel to obtain the defendants consent
to every tactical decision. As with the choice to proceed before a magistrate judge during voir
dire, the decision to have a criminal defendant presentand in close proximity to individual
jurorsduring individual voir dire conducted at sidebar is tactical and does not require the
defendants express consent. (quoting Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004))); Cox v.
Ayers, 414 F. Appx 80, 84 (9th Cir. 2011) (The trial court did not violate Petitioners right
to be present when it excluded him from a side-bar conference about counsels decision not to
present a closing argument during the guilt phase. This particular bench conference was not
a critical stage in the trial. Further, the record shows that Petitioner was present in court
during discussions about his right to present a defense, that he was aware of his counsels
decisions and actions and had the opportunity to object in court, and that he never objected
to his counsels decisions, actions, or assertion on the record that there was no conflict
between counsel and Petitioner about their defense strategy. Under these circumstances,
Petitioner had no right to be present at the side-bar conference for the purpose of objecting
to counsels strategic decision.) (citations omitted).
60. See, e.g., State v. Overline, 296 P.3d 420, 424 (Idaho App. 2012); State v. Bauer, 851
N.W.2d 711, 716-18 (S.D. 2014).
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will preside over jury selection61 or closing argument,62 and whether
the same or a different judge would preside over a resentencing af-
ter appeal.63
Most courts hold that Nixon is inapplicable when the client ac-
tually objects.64 This seems right. Although there is some question
whether the Supreme Court would agree,65 some lower courts have
held that a lawyer may be obligated not to comply with a clients
61. See Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 250-51 (2008).
62. See United States v. Gamba, 541 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2008) (After all, few
defendants have the training to permit them to appreciate the various legal concerns at issue
when a magistrate judge is delegated authority to preside over closing argument. An attorney
understands the importance of consistency in a trial proceeding, therefore, he is best equipped
to make an immediate determination as to the risks or benefits of accepting a magistrate
judge as a substitute for a district court judge.).
63. See United States v. Oakes, 680 F.3d 1243, 1247-48 (10th Cir. 2012) (In the present
case it is not disputed that defense counsel requested that the same judge conduct the re-
sentencing. What Defendant challenges is his attorneys authority to make that request on
his behalf. He asserts that only he could make the request and that he did not personally,
knowingly, and intelligently waive his right to resentencing before another judge. We reject
the argument.) (footnote omitted).
64. Compare People v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 699 n.11 (Colo. 2010) (distinguishing
Nixon from the case before the court, in which the defendant explicitly objected to counsels
actions on his behalf ), and Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 847 (Del. 2009) (However, where,
as here, the defendant adamantly objects to counsels proposed objective to concede guilt and
pursue a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, and counsel proceeds with that objective anyway,
the defendant is effectively deprived of his constitutional right to decide personally whether
to plead guilty to the prosecutions case, to testify in his own defense, and to have a trial by
an impartial jury.), and State v. Humphries, 336 P.3d 1121, 1125 (Wash. 2014) (Although
courts can presume a defendant consents to a stipulation, this presumption disappears where
the defendant expressly objects.), with United States v. Flores, 739 F.3d 337, 340 (7th Cir.
2014) (Flores tries to distinguish Nixon as a situation in which counsel alerted his client to
his plan to concede guilt on some charges, while Flores insists that his lawyer never told him
what the trial strategy would be and thus violated the duty to discuss tactics with the
accused. This is not a compelling line of distinction, because Nixon, having been alerted, sat
in silence and neither approved nor objected. The Court nonetheless held that counsels per-
formance met the [S]ixth [A]mendments requirements. Lack of notice seems a lesser sin,
unless we are confident that the client would have objected and that counsel would have
followed the accuseds instructions.) (citations omitted), and Woodward v. Epps, 580 F.3d
318, 327 (5th Cir. 2009) (Here, however, the trial judge afforded Woodward an opportunity
to express disagreement with his counsels tactics on the record, which he did not. Had
Woodward expressed disagreement with his counsels strategy, this might present a closer
question as to whether Cronics presumption of prejudice applies. We find that Stricklands
standard applies here. (citing Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004), and United States
v. Thomas, 417 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2005))).
65. In Burt v. Titlow, the Court held that a lawyer was entitled to act on a clients inac-
curate statement of facts, without independent investigation, even though that course led to
disaster. See 134 S. Ct. 10, 18 (2013).
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request if it is unreasonable or unwise for some reason, and if the
matter is within the lawyers authority to decide.66 There is also dis-
agreement on whether client consultation is actually required or if
consultation is merely good practice.67 It is hard to imagine a legiti-
mate reason for a lawyer not to consult with her client about plea
offers.68 In practice, however, as long as the decision to concede is
reasonable in the first place, a client will have difficulty proving
prejudice, even if the attorneys failure to consult, or decision to act
in spite of a clients objection, constitutes deficient performance.69
66. Bemore v. Chappell, 788 F.3d 1151, 1164 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating that counsel may
have a duty to discourage his client from presenting an uncorroborated, implausible alibi
theory); Hayes v. State, 56 So. 3d 72, 74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam) (We recog-
nize that, in this case, there is some evidence that Hayes objected to the defense that counsel
intended to assert. But in light of Hayes history of mental illness, the evidence against him,
and his fragile mental state prior to trial, it is not clear that counsels decision to honor Hayes
objection was reasonable.). But see Ex parte Mills, 62 So. 3d 574, 590 (Ala. 2010) (Simply
because defense counsel may make the tactical decision whether to request certain jury in-
structions, it does not follow that the trial court is required to follow the wishes of defense
counsel as to every decision regarding trial strategy under any circumstance, even over the
objection of the defendant.).
67. Compare Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 891 (9th Cir. 2007) (Stenson argues that
Leathermans concession of guilt went beyond Nixon because Leatherman did not consult with
him before conceding that he accepted the jurys guilty verdict. But Nixon did not hold that
an attorney must obtain defendants consent when conceding guilt in the sentencing phase.),
Davenport v. Diguglielmo, 215 F. Appx 175, 180 (3d Cir. 2007) (Even if Davenport did not
explicitly consent to trial counsels pursuit of the diminished capacity defense or the conces-
sion of guilt during his closing argument, we do not find defense counsels performance
deficient.), Atwater v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 799, 808 (11th Cir. 2006) ([T]he concession of guilt
was a legitimate trial strategy even without the defendants knowledge or consent.), and
Commonwealth v. Cousin, 888 A.2d 710, 722 (Pa. 2005) (Appellant ... urges us to construe
Nixon narrowly as applying only in capital cases where defense counsel has informed the
defendant that the optimal strategy is to concede guilt but the defendant fails to respond....
While Appellants argument is not without some foundation, we ultimately do not read Nixon
so narrowly.), with Thomas, 417 F.3d at 1056 ([W]e assume that counsels concession of guilt
without consultation or consent is deficient. (citing Nixon, 543 U.S. at 187 (An attorney
undoubtedly has a duty to consult with the client regarding important decisions, including
questions of overarching defense strategy.); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688
(1984) (same))).
68. It is always possible, of course, that through discussion counsel will become convinced
that she is wrong.
69. Lott v. Trammell, 705 F.3d 1167, 1189 (10th Cir. 2013) (And, given the overwhelming
evidence of Lotts involvement in the charged crimes, we could not say that Lott was preju-
diced.); Darden v. United States, 708 F.3d 1225, 1233 (11th Cir. 2013) (Nixon can be read
in one of two compelling ways. On the one hand, the Supreme Courts statement that [a]n
attorney undoubtedly has a duty to consult with the client, suggest[s] that consultation could
be the key fact that requires Strickland prejudice to be presumed under Cronic. On the other
hand, the fact that the Nixon Court went to pains to distinguish a guilty plea and concession
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Nixon makes clear that, in some circumstances, it is constitution-
ally reasonable for a lawyer to concede a clients guilt.70 At the same
time, conceding guilt without a clients permission is ironic and ex-
traordinaryreminiscent of destroying the village in order to save
it. As the Utah Court of Appeals explained, conceding a clients
guilt to the jury is at times a paradigmatic example of the sort of
breakdown in the adversarial process that the Sixth Amendment
guards against.71 Accordingly, conceding guilt remains fully subject
to scrutiny under the Sixth Amendment, and because of its unusu-
al nature, courts should be willing to take a closer look at a decision
to concede guilt than at ordinary tactical decisions. When a con-
cession is made by inadvertence,72 or as an error in judgment when
strategy suggests that consent is irrelevant for determining whether prejudice should be
presumed. And furthermore, Cronics presumed prejudice standard is only available in
extreme circumstances where counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecutions case to
meaningful adversarial testing. We are convinced the latter reading is correct, and the
former an unwarranted expansion of the Cronic exception. (quoting Florida v. Nixon, 543
U.S. 175, 187 (2004), and Harvey v. Warden, Union Corr. Inst., 629 F.3d 1228, 1251 (11th Cir.
2011))) (citations omitted); Hendrix v. State, No. S15A1169, 2015 WL 6631487, at *3 (Ga. Nov.
2, 2015) ([A]n attorneys failure to fulfill the duty to consult regarding trial strategy does not
in and of itself constitute ineffective assistance.) (citation omitted).
70. Indeed, some litigants have claimed that their lawyer was ineffective for not conceding
guilt. See Hernandez v. State, No. SC13-2330, 2015 WL 5445655, at *31 (Fla. Sept. 17, 2015)
(noting that Hernandez contends that Stokes was ineffective in failing to concede second-
degree murder, and that the defense presented in the guilt phase, which contested all the
crimes charged, was incoherent and not credible, prejudicing the defendant in the penalty
phase but rejecting claim on the merits, because failing to concede was reasonable).
71. State v. Lingmann, 320 P.3d 1063, 1072 (Utah Ct. App. 2014) (quoting United States
v. Gonzalez, 596 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 2010)).
72. See, e.g., Benitez-Saldana v. State, 67 So. 3d 320, 323 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (Prior
to trial, counsel had explained that he intended to admit that Benitez-Saldana was guilty of
grand theft but deny responsibility for a robbery or a burglary with an assault or battery.
While counsel attempted to pursue this trial strategy by making assertions to this effect,
counsels factual concessions inadvertently established Benitez-Saldanas responsibility for
the charged crimes.).
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the evidence is not overwhelming,73 courts, appropriately, are will-
ing to find counsel ineffective and invalidate convictions.
II. NIXON, LAWYER AUTONOMY, AND PLEA BARGAINING
A. The Nixon Minimum: Maintaining Credibility for Sentencing
Courts now hold that in an appropriate case, strategic conces-
sions of guilt can strengthen a defendants position and represent
not just reasonable professional assistance, but astute advocacy.74
Thus, it may be appropriate for counsel to concede on some counts
or issues in order to strengthen the likelihood of acquittal or favor-
able finding on others.75 Or, as in Nixon itself, it may be appropriate
strategy for an attorney to concede guilt on all charged offenses to
73. See Thompson v. Small, 145 F. Appx 581, 583 (9th Cir. 2005) ([U]nlike Nixon, this
is not a capital case, evidence of guilt is not overwhelming, and avoiding execution is not the
best and only realistic result possible. This is a non-capital case in which the only evidence
of guilt was conflicting testimony. Nevertheless, defense counsel admitted the credibility of
the governments principal eyewitnesses, and then proceeded to admit his clients failure to
raise reasonable doubt on the only element of robbery being contested at trial. In fact he stat-
ed that the defense had proved the prosecutions case beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover,
counsel continued to rely exclusively on a necessity defense despite the courts refusal to issue
a necessity instruction. (quoting Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190 (2004)) (citations
omitted)); Mohanlal v. State, 162 So. 3d 1043, 1046 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (per curiam)
(ordering hearing on claim of ineffective assistance where [t]he summary record does not
show any reasonable tactical reason for admitting to the phone sex); Edgar v. State, 283 P.3d
152, 159-60 (Kan. 2012) (Despite this recognition that most trial decisions are left to defense
counsels professional judgment regarding strategy, [m]ere invocation of the word strategy
does not insulate the performance of a criminal defendants lawyer from constitutional
criticism, especially when counsel lacks the information to make an informed decision due to
inadequacies of his or her investigation. (quoting State v. Gonzales, 212 P.3d 215, 221 (Kan.
2009))); see also id. at 159-60 (In addition, [a]n attorney undoubtedly has a duty to consult
with the client regarding important decisions, including questions of overarching defense
strategy. Edgars allegations place this last qualification into issue; he suggests defense
counsels closing argument was contrary to agreed-upon defense strategy. Hence, in this case,
the first prong of the Strickland/Chamberlain test could not be determined based merely on
a conclusion that defense counsels closing argument was trial strategy. Rather, as the Court
of Appeals concluded, factual questions exist that cannot be determined without an
evidentiary hearing. (quoting Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004)) (citations omitted)
(alteration in original)).
74. Lingmann, 320 P.3d at 1072.
75. See, e.g., Martin v. Waddington, 118 F. Appx 225, 226 (9th Cir. 2004) (Conceding
guilt of promoting prostitution was strategic because the charge was supported by overwhelm-
ing evidence, and the concession provided an avenue to gain credibility with the jury to more
effectively argue that the State had not met its burden on the two more serious charges.). 
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preserve credibility for sentencing.76 In the federal system, for ex-
ample, a defendant who pleads guilty is often given a two-point
reduction under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.77 But a defendant
who goes to trial and concedes guilt through counsel might also be
able to obtain the reduction.78
The necessary conditions for considering whether a concession
might be warranted without client consent are when: (1) the prose-
cution has overwhelming admissible and readily available evidence
of guilt;79 (2) there are no arguable defenses; and (3) there is reason
to expect some concrete advantage for the client because of the con-
cession. When those conditions exist, the option of concession may
be better than the other alternatives. A defense lawyer could in-
stead hold the prosecution to the letter of the rules of evidence, but
[t]oo many objections will, of course, annoy the jury.80 A lawyer can
aggressively cross-examine truthful prosecution witnesses,81 but,
given the overwhelming evidence, the impeachment will probably
be on peripheral issues, be unsuccessful, or successfully undermine
testimony about issues that are also supported by unimpeachable
76. The general principle of strategic concession may be sound, but it is not necessarily
the right strategy in the Nixon v. Florida context. In Elmore v. Sinclair, Judge Andrew
Hurwitz wrote that: [P]leading guilty without a guarantee that the prosecution will recom-
mend a life sentence holds little if any benefit for the defendant. 781 F.3d 1160, 1177 n.1 (9th
Cir. 2015) (Hurwitz, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result) (quoting Florida v.
Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 191 n.6 (2004)); see also id. (citing Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life:
Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 331-32 (1983)
(noting that there is usually some value in putting on a reasonable doubt defense [during the
guilt phase] even in cases where overwhelming evidence of guilt exists, and observing that
a reasonable doubt defense does not preclude the defendant from making a remorse defense
during the penalty phase)).
77. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMMN 2014).
78. See id. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.2 (This adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant who
puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements
of guilt .... [However,] [i]n rare situations, a defendant may clearly demonstrate an acceptance
of responsibility for his criminal conduct even though he exercises his constitutional right to
a trial. This may occur, for example, where a defendant goes to trial to assert and preserve
issues that do not relate to factual guilt.).
79. See, e.g., Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 890 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that conces-
sion may be appropriate [w]hen the evidence against a defendant in a capital case is
overwhelming and counsel concedes guilt in an effort to avoid the death penalty).
80. ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 98 (1999).
81. See R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us
About a Prosecutors Ethical Duty to Seek Justice, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 668 (2006)
(Most scholars now agree that it is ethically appropriate, if not ethically required, for a
criminal defense attorney to impeach a truthful witness.).
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evidence. As Justice Stevens explained: [T]he Sixth Amendment
does not require that counsel do what is impossible or unethical. If
there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create
one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a
useless charade.82
When evidence of guilt is overwhelming and there is no available
defense, courts have also upheld counsels use of the silent strat-
egy... the phrase often used to describe an attorneys decision either
not to participate at trial or to participate minimally.83 This strat-
egy reduces the risk that the jury or judge will look on the client
with disfavor, but it does nothing to obtain the benefit which might
be available through a concession. Compared to doing nothing, or
doing nothing useful, a concession which might lead to a sentencing
advantage could be a preferable trial strategy.
B. Implications for Formal and Further Concessions
In limited circumstances, a lawyer might permissibly concede her
clients guilt in the inchoate hope of creating an advantage for her
client at sentencing. If this is so, then it also should be permissible
for counsel to make decisions about issues less substantial than
conceding guilt in the hope of obtaining leniency.84 In addition, it
should be permissible for lawyers to make concessions for expecta-
tions more substantial than the mere hope of maintaining credibil-
ity for sentencing.
Concretely, imagine if the prosecutor in Nixon offered to take the
death penalty off the table in exchange for a concession of guilt and
an agreement not to contest a sentence of life without parole. If
Nixons lawyer could permissibly concede guilt for a mere hope of a
benefit, then a concession for an enforceable promise would be at
least as reasonable. Imagine further that the prosecutor was not
satisfied with a concession of guilt, but she instead wanted defense
counsel to stipulate also to the admission of prosecution exhibits
and summaries of prior testimony. Assume that defense counsel had
82. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 n.19 (1984).
83. Walker v. State, 892 A.2d 547, 561 (Md. 2006) (citing Warner v. Ford, 752 F.2d 622,
625 (11th Cir. 1985)).
84. See John Rappaport, Unbundling Criminal Trial Rights, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 184
(2015).
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every reason to think that the substance of everything the prose-
cutor wanted was admissible and would be admitted. Under those
circumstances, it is hard to see how that hypothetical stipulation
would put Nixon in a worse place than he was in at the actual trial.
On the contrary, in the hypothetical, he obtained a benefit. This hy-
pothetical assumes that counsels decision-making authority is
scalable and cumulative. If a lawyer can stipulate to one thing, she
can stipulate to one hundred things; if a lawyer has power to stipu-
late, waive a defense, or decline to call or cross-examine witnesses,
then she can do all of those things in the same case if it is reason-
able.
If defense counsel may permissibly concede for a benefit instead
of a hope, then defense counsel and the prosecution could substan-
tially replicate a guilty plea without affirmative client consent and
without defense counsel putting words in the defendants mouth.
After negotiation between the prosecutor and defense counsel, de-
fense counsel could, in a document such as a pretrial statement,
agree to waive a jury (or peremptory challenges and individual voir
dire once twelve qualified jurors were seated). Prosecution exhibits
could be stipulated into evidence. Preliminary hearing testimony
could be admitted by stipulation even if the witnesses were avail-
able, or defense counsel could stipulate as to the substance of the
testimony.85 Defense counsel could report that she had no witnesses
to offer and no basis, or at least no intention, to cross-examine or
impeach any prosecution witnesses.
In exchange, the prosecution could stipulate to advantageous
sentencing facts, withdraw or commit to not filing notices for a man-
datory minimum sentence or particular sentence enhancements, or
recommend or not oppose a specific sentence. Depending on the ju-
risdiction, this sort of pretrial agreement could be the subject of
judicial approval. The documentation of such a trial might be quite
similar to that normally used in a carefully crafted guilty plea
agreement. To protect the prosecutor, the agreement could waive
double jeopardy (or agree that a manifest-necessity mistrial is
appropriate) if the defense breaches the agreement by impeaching
85. See, e.g., United States v. Kleinschmidt, 596 F.2d 133, 136 (5th Cir. 1979) (upholding
such a stipulation).
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a prosecution witness on an unexpected ground or offering a
surprise witness or argument.
Although these changes would streamline the prosecutions pre-
sentation, critically, they are in large part matters of timing, not
substance. If Nixons lawyers concession of guilt was reasonable, it
was so only because the lawyer knew the jury would, in time, reach
that conclusion on its own. By hypothesis, a strategy of concession
without client consent is reasonable only when defense counsel is
confident that the prosecution can prove every element of the of-
fense with overwhelming admissible evidence, and when the defense
can respond with no meaningful exculpatory argument. Also, unlike
disclosure of affirmative evidence, there is little strategic advantage
to the prosecutor in early defense notice of a reasonable concession.
Thus, negotiating to streamline the trial means making clear in
advance only what defense counsel knows will inevitably develop.
This sort of negotiation allows defense counsel to get an advantage
for the client in exchange for acknowledging facts that the defense
will later be unable to contest.
The Court has made clear, although perhaps in dicta, that a client
herself must be the one to waive certain fundamental rights.86 There
is an argument that waiver by counsel should be permitted when
counsel has permissibly conceded important substantive aspects of
the case. In his concurrence in the judgment in Gonzalez v. United
States, Justice Scalia proposed that counsel should be able to invoke
or waive all rights except the right to counsel itself, which was
personal to the client.87 That is, there would be no special treatment
for waiver of the right to testify, to a jury, or to appeal. He con-
tended that there was no principled basis for distinction between
waivable and nonwaivable rights:
I would not adopt the tactical-vs.-fundamental approach,
which is vague and derives from nothing more substantial than
this Courts say-so.... Depending on the circumstances, waiving
any right can be a tactical decision. Even pleading guilty, which
waives the right to trial, is highly tactical, since it usually
86. See, e.g., Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-18 (1988) ([T]here are basic rights that
the attorney cannot waive without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of
the client.).
87. 553 U.S. 242, 257 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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requires balancing the prosecutors plea bargain against the
prospect of better and worse outcomes at trial.
Whether a right is fundamental is equally mysterious. One
would think that any right guaranteed by the Constitution
would be fundamental. But I doubt many think that the Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses cannot be waived by
counsel. Perhaps, then, specification in the Constitution is a
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for fundamental status.
But if something more is necessary, I cannot imagine what it
might be. Apart from constitutional guarantee, I know of no
objective criterion for ranking rights.88
Justice Scalia explained: There is no basis in the Constitution, or
as far as I am aware in common law practice for distinguishing in
this regard between a criminal defendant and his authorized repre-
sentative. In fact, the very notion of representative litigation sug-
gests that the Constitution draws no distinction between them.89
Justice Scalia was right that it is not clear why some decisions
are said to be for the client only, yet others are left to counsel. The
ethical constraints seem not to be independent but rather derivative
of Supreme Court dicta.90 The ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct provide that the lawyer shall abide by the clients decision,
after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, wheth-
er to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.91 But the
annotators explanation is that the ethical constraint is based on
constitutional law: [A] lawyer representing a criminal defendant
must meet obligations imposed by the Constitution, as well as those
imposed by the ethics rules. The decision-making authority of a
criminal defendant is therefore broader than that of a client in a
civil matter.92
Similarly, the rationale of the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers is not based on ethical considerations per se, but on what
is perceived to be the constitutional doctrine:
88. Id. at 256 (citations omitted).
89. Id. at 257. However, consistent with Nixon, Justice Scalia would not allow attorney
action over a clients objection. Id. at 254.
90. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
91. MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASSN 2015).
92. ELLEN J. BENNETT ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT 38 (8th ed.
2015).
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Constitutional criminal law requires decisions about three
matters to be made personally by the client: whether to plead
guilty, whether to waive jury trial, and whether to testify.
Delegation of those decisions to a lawyer, even a revocable
delegation, is not permitted. Guilty pleas in criminal prosecu-
tions have drastic effects for the client. The legal system has
strong interests in requiring the defendant to participate per-
sonally in securing pleas that are not susceptible to later claims
of involuntariness. A criminal defendants decision whether to
waive the right to jury trial or to testify also involves surrender
of basic constitutional rights and implicates the defendants
autonomy and participation in the trial.93
Again, there is no independent rationale in the commentary for dis-
tinct treatment of these rights.
In a case in which guilt is contested, it makes sense for the client
to decide whether a judge or jury is the factfinder. The client will
often be better able than the lawyer to evaluate how the community
will perceive the case. But the Florida v. Nixon scenario is different.
If the trial is one in which counsel, consistent with the Sixth
Amendment, may concede factual guilt in opening, has determined
not to cross-examine prosecution witnesses or call any of her own,
and has introduced undisputed facts through stipulation or prior
testimony, then the jury does not play a critical role. Because in
such cases the die has been cast and conviction is a foregone conclu-
sion, nominal jury participation does not give the client a better
chance of acquittal or change the legitimacy of the inevitable
decision. In such cases, it is not clear what client interest is further-
ed by holding that only a client can waive the right to a jury. In such
cases, defense counsel should be able to waive a jury unless the
client affirmatively objects.
Clearly, counsel should not have the unilateral authority to waive
the clients right to challenge whether the lawyers action was con-
sistent with the Sixth Amendment through either appeal or collat-
eral attack. Whatever the status of effective assistance of counsel
93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 22 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
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waivers in other contexts,94 a Nixon concession is sufficiently
unusual and in potential tension with constitutional norms that
vicarious waiver should not be permitted.
C. Objections
There are, of course, a number of potential objections to this argu-
ment. None of them seem fatal.
1. Client Autonomy
This proposal is unabashedly paternalistic, although so is Nixon
itself. It assumes that, in very limited circumstances, lawyers
should be able to make decisions in the absence of a client decision.
Nevertheless, even if every possible step has been taken to get client
consent, unilateral attorney action will do nothing to generate client
confidence in the criminal justice system. Justice Brennan passion-
ately dissented in favor of client autonomy in Jones v. Barnes:
I cannot accept the notion that lawyers are one of the punish-
ments a person receives merely for being accused of a crime.
Clients, if they wish, are capable of making informed judgments
about which issues to appeal, and when they exercise that pre-
rogative their choices should be respected unless they would
require lawyers to violate their consciences, the law, or their
duties to the court.95
Overriding client autonomy inevitably involves an element of dis-
respect, no matter how well intentioned the action may be.96
There is a significant argument that impairment of client auton-
omy is worth the costs. Doctrine already constrains client autonomy
in a range of ways. The criminal proceeding is not necessarily fun-
damentally a forum for vindication of the clients right to make her
94. See generally Nancy J. King, Plea Bargains That Waive Claims of Ineffective
AssistanceWaiving Padilla and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 647 (2013) (arguing defendants may
knowingly and voluntarily waive their right to claim ineffective assistance of counsel, but
enforcing such waivers in the context of plea bargaining would be unwise).
95. 463 U.S. 745, 764 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96. Erica Hashimoto has persuasively made the case for client autonomy in a range of
circumstances. See generally Hashimoto, supra note 17.
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own decisions; a clients participation in it at all is almost always
compelled. Most aspects of the process will occur regardless of the
clients views, or even without her voluntary participation. And even
aspects of the process in which the client has a choice are not always
deemed central. For example, many courts hold that denial of a de-
fendants right to testify is subject to harmless error analysis.97
One justification for infringement in the Nixon situation is that
there is no way to avoid running roughshod over a clients interests.
The client either loses her autonomy now by having her wishes
overridden, or she loses her autonomy later by imprisonment for
years longer than she otherwise would have been confined.
Abbe Smiths comment that adolescents not only make bad
decisions, they make decisions badly98 might not be unfairly ex-
tended to defendants as a whole. Professor Albert Alschuler dryly
noted that criminal defendants may not be an especially rational
group.99 The point is not that clients do not deserve to make choices
because they are not smart enough. But it may be that they are dis-
proportionately unable to make reliable and informed decisions
about the merits of various possible courses of action. The justifica-
tion for lawyer decision making goes beyond the claim that because
97. Compare Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152, 166 (Tenn. 1999) ([T]he vast majority of
jurisdictions which have considered this issue have held either that the harmless error doc-
trine applies when a defendant establishes a denial of the right to testify under the Fifth
Amendment or that the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington must be established if
the defendant is to prove ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of counsels unilateral
waiver of the right to testify.) (citation omitted), and State v. Nelson, 849 N.W.2d 317, 319
(Wis. 2014) (We conclude that harmless error review applies to the circuit courts alleged
denial of Nelsons right to testify because its effect on the outcome of the trial is capable of
assessment. We further conclude that, given the nature of Nelsons defense and the over-
whelming evidence of her guilt, the alleged error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.)
(citation omitted), with State v. Rivera, 741 S.E.2d 694, 706 (S.C. 2013) (The Supreme Court
has not directly addressed whether a trial courts improper refusal to permit a defendant to
testify in his own defense is a structural error or one which is subject to harmless-error
analysis. We find this error is not amenable to harmless-error analysis and requires reversal
without a particularized prejudice inquiry.). See generally Kenneth Duvall, The Defendant
Was Not Heard ... Now What?: Prejudice Analysis, Harmless Error Review, and the Right to
Testify, 35 HAMLINE L. REV. 279 (2012).
98. Smith, Challenges in Counseling, supra note 6, at 20 (quoting Elizabeth Cauffman &
Laurence Steinberg, Researching Adolescents Judgment and Culpability, in YOUTH ON TRIAL:
A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 243, 243 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G.
Schwartz eds., 2000)).
99. Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorneys Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J.
1179, 1245 (1975).
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lawyers make better decisions, their judgments and values should
be honored. Instead, the justification is that defense lawyers may
be in a position to make reliable predictions about what the client
would in fact choose if she understood what was at stake. Defense
lawyers have seen many clients make many choices and know that
clients come to regret certain kinds of decisions.100 A defense law-
yers decision to salvage a hopeless case does not necessarily conflict
with the clients moral or political judgment. Instead, counsel may
be facilitating a decision that the lawyer has reason to believe the
client, in the future, will wish she had made.
Finally, there are interests beyond those of the client herself.
This is illustrated by the Courts decisions regarding the right of
self-representation at trial.101 The self-representation right does not
apply on appeal; a defendant can be forced to appear through
counsel or not at all.102 Nor is the right to self-representation at trial
necessarily violated by involuntary imposition of standby counsel,
even over the defendants objection, so long as standby counsel does
not override the defendants tactical decisions103 or destroy the ju-
rys perception that the defendant is representing himself.104
A defendant who meets the quite minimal competency standards
necessary to stand trial, but who is nevertheless profoundly mental-
ly ill, may be denied self-representation entirely.105 The Court had
previously grounded the right of self-representation in principles of
100. See, e.g., Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge at 11,
Braswell v. United States, No. A-10-CR-692-LY, 2014 WL 774670, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 25,
2014) ([I]t is plain that Braswell rejected the governments second plea deal against [coun-
sels] advice, and now regrets that.); Dong Cai v. United States, No. 13-CV-3617, 2013 WL
5934314, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2013) (When [defense counsel] discussed the governments
final proposed plea agreement with Cai, petitioner expressed regret at having rejected the
prior offer.); United States v. Ellis, No. 05-495-KKC, 2006 WL 3412280, at *6 (E.D. Ky. Aug.
16, 2006) (Ellis simply regrets his own decision to reject the plea offer and is attempting to
blame both of his attorneys.).
101. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975) (holding the defendant had
a right to conduct his own defense).
102. See Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 163 (2000).
103. See id. at 162.
104. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984).
105. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 167 (2008) (holding a state can deny a
defendant the right to represent himself when the defendant is competent to stand trial but
not competent to proceed pro se). See generally Christopher Slobogin, Mental Illness and Self-
Representation: Faretta, Godinez and Edwards, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 391 (2009).
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dignity and autonomy,106 but the majority in Indiana v. Edwards
reasoned:
[T]he spectacle that could well result from ... self-representation
at trial is at least as likely to prove humiliating as ennobling.
Moreover, insofar as a defendants lack of capacity threatens an
improper conviction or sentence, self-representation in that ex-
ceptional context undercuts the most basic of the Constitutions
criminal law objectives, providing a fair trial.107
In addition, proceedings must not only be fair, they must appear
fair to all who observe them.108 That is, there is an interest in sub-
stantive accuracy and fairness that sometimes trumps an individ-
uals interest in autonomy and dignity. Finally, many cases deny
requests for self-representation based on an untimely assertion of
the right, again indicating that it is far from absolute.109 As a result,
savvy clients could not overcome Florida v. Nixon by demanding to
represent themselves at the eleventh houralthough they could
probably do so by objecting to counsels actions with which they
disagreed.
106. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 176 (quoting McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 176).
107. Id. at 176-77.
108. Id. at 177 (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988)); see also, e.g.,
United States v. Chapman, 593 F.3d 365, 370 (4th Cir. 2010) (And notwithstanding the fact
that a principal generally has the authority to dictate the manner in which his agent will
carry out his duties, the law places certain tactical decisions solely in the hands of the crim-
inal defense attorney. This reallocation of rights and duties is necessary to give effect to the
constitutional rights granted to criminal defendants and to insure the effective operation of
our adversarial system, where defense attorneys must protect the interests of their clients
while also serving as officers of the court.).
109. See United States v. McKinley, 58 F.3d 1475, 1480 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding self-
representation right must be invoked timely, clearly, and unequivocally); People v. Windham,
560 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Cal. 1977) ([W]hen a defendant has elected to proceed to trial rep-
resented by counsel and the trial has commenced, it is thereafter within the sound discretion
of the trial court to determine whether such a defendant may dismiss counsel and proceed pro
se.); Commonwealth v. El, 977 A.2d 1158, 1165 (Pa. 2009) (declaring that, because
meaningful trial proceedings had commenced, defendants subsequent request for self-
representation was untimely and therefore he was not entitled to self-representation).
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2. Opening the Door to Bad Lawyering
Another potential objection is that embrace of this doctrine,
intended to offer a tool to conscientious lawyers, would protect bad
lawyering. Lawyers could wash their hands of difficult cases and too
easily sell clients down the river.110 But the conduct of lawyers is
already evaluated deferentially.111 Lawyers in appointed cases can
easily get away with providing minimalist representation. Unlike in
the commercial realm, few criminal defendants both are repeat
players and have market power. In addition, the incentives of de-
fense counsel are often to take the case to trialbecause they get
paid by the hour, sometimes more for in-court timeeven though
there is no reason to think that the outcome will be better than the
last best plea offer.112
One protective measure should be closer scrutiny of a decision to
plead guilty without client consent through the ineffective assis-
tance of counsel regime, rather than ordinary tactical decisions.
Pleading guilty may be a tactical decision, but it is an extraordi-
nary one. Another protective measure, which could be adopted by
institutions employing or paying criminal defense attorneys, might
be to require a second opinion from another attorney before this
type of arrangement could be concluded.113
110. For a discussion of the importance of enforcement of Sixth Amendment rights, see
Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis,
57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1031-32 (2006) (discussing problems in indigent defense), and Jenia
Iontcheva Turner, Effective Remedies for Ineffective Assistance, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 949,
949-54 (2013).
111. As Professor Garrett has aptly noted, the Strickland v. Washington inquiry is notori-
ously malleable. Brandon L. Garrett, Validating the Right to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 927, 929 (2013).
112. A now-famous Rand study found that in Philadelphia, public defenders achieved better
outcomes in murder cases than appointed counsel. See James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton,
How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case
Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154, 159 (2012). One reason was that clients of public defenders pled
guilty more often; appointed counsel had a financial incentive ... to take a case to trial when
that may not be in the clients best interest. Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Does the
Lawyer Make a Difference? Public Defender v. Appointed Counsel, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2012,
at 46, 46-47 (citing Anderson & Heaton, supra).
113. One means of providing a check on the lawyer in this situation would be to require
the lawyer to confer with another attorney, analogous to the second opinion requirement in
medical practice. Christopher Slobogin & Amy Mashburn, The Criminal Defense Lawyers Fi-
duciary Duty to Clients with Mental Disability, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1581, 1641 n.279 (2000)
(arguing that defense counsel should be able to plead guilty for certain mentally disabled
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3. Straw Case
A final objection is that there are few, if any, prosecutions that
are entirely hopeless. Every experienced trial lawyer, it seems, can
recount apparently unwinnable cases which came out in surprising
ways. Just as many good appellate defenders go through their entire
careers without filing an Anders no-merit brief, perhaps good de-
fense attorneys can always come up with some hook, some creative
legal theory or imaginative spin on the facts which can be advanced
with a straight face.
It is true that in any case, a bolt from the blue might bring an
unexpected victory; the key police investigator might be indicted or
the file might disappear.114 But such improbable rarities do not
warrant categorically discarding an available strategy that has a
reasonable chance of success in the face of a practical certainty of a
conviction.
Another potential problem is that allowing pleas without client
consent might induce lawyers to stop the persuasion and counseling
process earlier than they should. An important skill of good lawyers
is building trust with clients so that the clients can make the right
decision. There is no question that it is better for a client to under-
stand her factual and legal situation and come to her own judgment.
On the other hand, even taking client autonomy seriously, perhaps
getting to the point at which the client does not objectthe Nixon
thresholdis enough.
CONCLUSION
Some clients decline reasonable plea offers in favor of a shot at
acquittal at trial or to make a moral or political point. Others, how-
ever, reject pleas even though the evidence is overwhelming, there
are no defenses, and their goal is to minimize or eliminate the sen-
tence. In such cases, clients may be throwing away their only chance
clients).
114. Cf. Gabriel J. Chin, Getting Out of Jail Free: Sentence Credit for Periods of Mistaken
Liberty, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 403, 403 (1996) (discussing situations in which a criminal
defendant experiences unexpected freedom and referencing Judge Cardozos quip, [t]he
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered (quoting People v. Defore, 150 N.E.
585, 587 (N.Y. 1926))).
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of reducing the time they will spend behind bars. When, after thor-
ough and careful investigation, it is clear that the case is hopeless,
defense counsel should be empowered to give their clients the best
defense available by getting some benefit out of the inevitable.
Conceding guilt without the clients permission should be an
unusual last resort. But in some cases, it will be the best available
chance of obtaining a benefit for the client.
